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Accounting for China’s Growth 
 
China has achieved impressive growth over the last three decades. However, there has been 
debate over the sources of the growth, and the role of the intensive versus extensive margin. 
Growth accounting exercises at the aggregate level (Rawski and Perkins, 2008; Bosworth 
and Collins, 2008) suggest an equal role for both. For the non-agricultural sector, there have 
been doubts about the contribution of TFP improvements to growth. For the period between 
1978 and 1998, Young (2003) stresses the role of labor deepening, including the reallocation 
from agriculture, while more recent analysis points to the role of rising rates of investment. 
Because labor reallocation across sectors, TFP growth at the sector level and investment are 
all inter-related, simple growth decompositions that are often used in the literature are not 
appropriate for quantifying their contributions to growth. In this paper, we develop a three-
sector dynamic model to quantify the sources of China’s growth. The sectors include 
agriculture, and within non-agriculture, the state and non-state components. We find only a 
modest role for labor reallocation from agriculture and capital deepening, and identify rising 
TFP in the non-state non-agricultural sector as the key driver of growth. We also find 
significant misallocation of capital: The less efficient state sector continues to absorb more 
than half of all fixed investment. If capital had been allocated efficiently, China could have 
achieved the same growth performance without any increase in the rate of aggregate 
investment. This has important implications for China as it tries to re-balance its growth. 
Finally, in light of important concerns over data, we examine the robustness of our key results 
to alternative data sets. 
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 1 Introduction
China has achieved impressive growth over the last three decades of reform. However there has
been continued debate over the sources of the growth, and the role of the intensive versus extensive
margin. Most aggregate growth accounting exercises for China ￿nd a nearly equal role for the two
(Bosworth and Collins (2007); Rawski and Perkins (2008)). But for the non-agricultural sector,
there have been doubts about the contribution of improvements in total factor productivity (TFP)
to growth. In an in￿ uential article, Young (2003) suggests that for the ￿rst two decades (1978-1998)
TFP growth in China￿ s non-agricultural sector was modest, and that labor deepening, including the
transfer of labor out of agriculture, was the key force behind the extraordinary improvements in per
capita living standards. For the period since the early 1990s, high and rising saving and investment
rates have shifted attention to the contribution of capital deepening in China￿ s growth. In fact, a
number of recent papers1 argue that China has become excessively dependent on investment for
growth.
The reallocation of labor from agriculture could have contributed to aggregate growth in China
if there were di⁄erences on the margins in the returns to labor between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. At the end of the Maoist era, about 70 percent of the labor force was in
agriculture. Moreover, a variety of institutional restrictions tied these individuals to the land and
severely limited their choice of economic activity, thereby resulting in lower returns to labor in
agriculture than outside the sector. Over the last three decades, the restrictions have been relaxed
signi￿cantly and the share of the labor force in agriculture has declined by more than 40 percent.
(See Figure 1.)
Increasing capital intensity by raising the rate of investment could also have been a source of
aggregate growth. At the start of the reforms, China￿ s capital to output ratio was 1.62, far below
1See, e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005); Kuijs and Wang (2005); Prasad and Rajan (2006); Aziz (2007); Lardy
(2007) and Prasad (2009).
1the average in the OECD countries. From 1978 to 2007, aggregate investment as a percentage of
GDP in China increased from 21 percent to 40 percent. (See Figure 2.)
So, in principle, the reallocation of labor from agriculture and the increases in the rate of in-
vestment could have been sources of China￿ s growth. But how important are they quantitatively?
Could China have achieved its remarkable growth performance without signi￿cant TFP improve-
ments in the non-agricultural sector? In this paper we develop a uni￿ed framework that allows us
to quantitatively address these questions. The key to our analysis is distinguishing between the
state and non-state components within the non-agricultural sector.2
In the late 1970s, much of employment and GDP outside of agriculture was in the state sec-
tor. With economic transition, there has been a substantial reallocation of labor within the non-
agricultural sector from the state to the non-state sector. Between 1978 and 2007, the state sector￿ s
share of total non-agricultural employment declined from 52 percent to only 13 percent. (See Figure
1.) As a result of soft budget constraints and other preferential policies favoring the state sector,
TFP growth in the state sector has consistently lagged that in the more dynamic non-state sector
by a wide margin (Je⁄erson and Rawski, 1994). Gains to this labor reallocation would be concealed
in analysis looking at the non-agricultural sector only in the aggregate.
The reallocation of capital between the two sectors has occurred much more slowly. Even as
late as 2007, more than half of all new capital formation was still going to the state sector despite
the fact that its contribution to GDP had fallen below thirty percent. This has two important
implications. First, the rate of return to capital likely di⁄ers signi￿cantly between the two sectors,
and capital is seriously misallocated. And second, capital accumulation in the state and non-
state sectors must be considered separately when trying to assess the overall contribution of rising
investment to China￿ s growth.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the contributions of the rising investment rate and
productivity growth within each sector as well as the labor reallocation across sectors to aggregate
TFP and labor productivity growth. The labor reallocations include those from the agriculture to
2In a previous study, we found that distinguishing the state and non-state sectors is also crucial to the under-
standing of aggregate ￿ uctuations and in￿ ation in China. See Brandt and Zhu (2000).
2non-agriculture, and within non-agriculture, from state to non-state. Because the reallocations of
labor across sectors are endogenous and generally depend on sector-level TFP growth and frictions
in the labor market, their contributions to aggregate TFP and labor productivity growth cannot
be quanti￿ed without taking into account the impact of these factors.
We construct a three-sector model that explicitly accounts for the interactions between these
factors and the labor reallocations. The sectors include agriculture and within the non-agricultural
sector, the state and non-state components. We take the sector level TFPs, between-sector wage
wedges and the aggregate investment rates as exogenous3 and let the model determine the alloca-
tion of capital and labor across sectors. We calibrate our benchmark model so that the model￿ s
predictions are consistent with the structural transformation and growth in China over the last
three decades. We then quantify the contribution of each prospective source of growth by eliminat-
ing its in￿ uence from the benchmark model and comparing the resulting outcome with that from
the benchmark model.4
1.1 Main Results
The importance of TFP growth in the non-state sector
Disaggregating the non-agricultural sector into its state and non-state components helps us
to identify TFP growth in the non-state non-agricultural sector as the most important source of
China￿ s growth. This role is obscured in more aggregate analysis that combines the state and
non-state sectors. Between 1978 and 2007, while TFP in the state sector grew at an annual rate of
1.52 percent per annum, the non-state sector￿ s TFP grew at a rate of 4.56 percent per annum. This
rapid TFP growth in the non-state sector helped to o⁄set the drag of the ine¢ cient state sector and
was instrumental in absorbing labor transferred out of agriculture. Employment in the non-state
3We treat the aggregate investment rates as exogenous in the model for two reasons. First, the aggregate investment
rate in China has been rising steadily over the last three decades. Such behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of
most standard growth models. While it is important to explain this puzzling behavior, we leave it for future research.
Second, we want to quantify the role of the rising investment rate in China￿ s growth. It would be hard to do so if the
investment rate is endogenously determined in the model.
4This model based accounting approach is similar to the one used by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997)
in their accounting for the contribution of investment-speci￿c technological change to long-run growth in the US.
3non-agricultural sector grew by more than 420 million between 1978 and 2007. Without the TFP
growth in the non-state sector, the growth rate of labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector
would have been reduced by 4.65 percent per annum, and the growth rate of GDP per worker in
China would have been reduced by 3.79 percent per annum.
As large as these contributions are, they could have been even larger if not for the capital
market distortions that prevented the non-state ￿rms from taking full advantage of their high
productivities.
The cost of capital market distortions and the unimportance of a rising investment rate
Our estimates show that since the early 1990s, the returns to capital in the non-state sector
have remained above 50 percent, implying a capital-labor ratio in the non-state sector that is too
low relative to its TFP levels. Although the state sector￿ s share of employment has declined sharply
in recent years, its share of ￿xed investments has declined only slowly. Even as late as 2007, the
state￿ s share of non-agricultural ￿xed investment, which represents more than 95 percent of total
￿xed investment, was 53 percent while its employment share was 13 percent. This bias has helped
to sustain a large and widening gap in the capital-labor ratio and the returns to capital between
the state and the non-state sectors.5 To quantify the impact of the misallocation of capital on
growth, we use our model to do a counter-factual simulation in which capital is allowed to ￿ ow
freely between the two sectors so that the returns to capital are equalized. In this case, the annual
growth rate of GDP per worker between 1978 and 2007 would have increased by 1.58 percentage
points.
The misallocation of capital has also made China￿ s government overly dependent on the increase
in capital intensity in promoting growth. Between 1978 and 2007, the aggregate investment rate
increased from 21 percent to 40 percent of GDP. Without this increase, aggregate labor productivity
growth rate would have been reduced by 1.37 percentage points. However, if capital had been
allowed to ￿ ow freely between the state and non-state sectors, the aggregate labor productivity
growth rate would have been increased by 0.06 percent. So, absent capital market distortions,
5Using ￿rm level data, Dollar and Wei (1997) also found a signi￿cant gap in returns to capital between the ￿rms
in the state and the non￿ state sectors.
4China could have achieved the same growth performance without any increase in the aggregate
investment rate.
Contributions of the structural transformations
Somewhat surprisingly, we ￿nd only a modest role for the reallocation of labor from agriculture:
Without the reallocation, aggregate labor productivity growth rate would have been reduced by
0.97 percent per annum. The reason for the modest contribution is the capital constraint faced by
the non-state non-agricultural sector, into which most of the labor leaving agriculture have gone.
Due to a lack of investment, the capital-labor ratio in the non-state non-agricultural sector has
grown very slowly, thereby limiting the gains from the labor reallocation from agriculture.
In contrast, we ￿nd a more important contribution of the reallocation from state to non-state
associated with economic transition: If the state sector￿ s share of non-agricultural employment had
stayed at its 1978 level, aggregate labor productivity growth rate would have been reduced by 1.61
percent per annum. A main reason the government disproportionately allocated capital to the state
sector was to maintain the high wages for the workers in that sectors. Without the reduction in the
state sector￿ s share of non-agricultural employment, even more capital would have been allocated
to the ine¢ cient sector, and aggregate productivity growth signi￿cantly reduced.
1.2 Robustness of our results
Concerns about the quality of the o¢ cial data continue to persist. Our quantitative analysis uses
a number of revised data series to address these concerns.6 However, our key quantitative results
are similar even if we use the o¢ cial data. In our analysis of the returns to capital in the state and
non-state sectors, we also examine the implications of treating infrastructure investment by the
state separately from the rest of state sector investment. We allow the returns to this investment
to be captured by both the state and non-state sectors. Although this lowers the relative return
to capital in the non-state sector, a signi￿cant gap remains in returns between the two sectors and
our quantitative analysis continues to identify the misallocation of capital as a serious problem.
6In an appendix, we reconcile our numbers with those used in the literature and, in particular, with those of Young
(2003) for the period between 1978 and 1998.
51.3 Related Literatures
Our paper is part of a growth accounting literature that tries to identify the sources of China￿ s
growth since 1978. (See Ren, 1993; Wang and Yao, 2001; Young, 2003; Zheng, Bigsten and Hu,
2006; Bosworth and Collins, 2008; Perkins and Rawski, 2008.) However, our paper is di⁄erent from
earlier studies in that we do growth accounting at the sector level and use a model to account for
the contributions of sector TFP and resource reallocation across sectors to growth.
Our paper￿ s emphasis on better resource allocation across sectors as a source of aggregate TFP
growth is related to a recent literature that attributes low aggregate TFP in developing countries
to misallocation at the micro-level. (See Caselli and Coleman, 2002; Gollin, Parente and Rogerson,
2004; Banerjee and Du￿ o, 2005; Restuccia, Yang and Zhu, 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008;
Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Gancia and Zillibotti, 2009; and Durate and Restuccia, 2010.)
In recent years there has been a debate in the literature and in policy circles about whether
China￿ s growth strategy is sustainable. This debate generally focuses on China￿ s high saving and
high investment rates. Many have argued that they are too high to be sustainable and China
needs to rebalance its growth strategy from promoting investment to promoting consumption. (See
the references in footnote 1.) Our paper contributes to this debate by showing that China could
potentially reduce the investment rate without lowering growth through better allocation of existing
capital in the economy. In other words, reducing distortions in the capital markets could help
China to maintain its high growth performance and restore the imbalance between consumption
and investment at the same time.
There are two recent papers that are closely related to ours. Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2006)
also use a dynamic three-sector model to study China￿ s growth. However, they do not explicitly
consider the factor market distortions, which we emphasize here. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2008) focus their study on the non-agricultural sector and use a dynamic two-sector model to
study the impact of ￿nancial market distortions on China￿ s investment allocation, saving and
growth. Their objective is to explain the high growth and high saving phenomena in China rather
than quantifying the sources of China￿ s growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brie￿ y examine a number of key
6data series, saving more detailed discussion for the appendix. Section 3 discusses the results of the
standard growth accounting, followed by an examination of the behavior of sector-level productivity.
We describe our benchmark model and discuss the driving forces of structural transformations in
Section 4. A key feature of the model is the link it draws between distortions in the labor market and
capital allocation. In section 5, we use this model to examine the contributions of China￿ s structural
transformations to TFP growth, and then situate this in the context of a growth accounting in which
changes in aggregate labor productivity come from either capital accumulation, TFP growth within
each sector, or inter-sector reallocation from low to high TFP sectors. In light of important concerns
over data issues in the literature, in the appendix we demonstrate that our ￿ndings are robust to
the use of alternative data series for key variables.
2 Data
We do growth accounting at the aggregate level, for the non-agricultural sector, and within the
non-agricultural sector, for the state and non-state components separately. This requires data on
nominal GDP, prices, employment and the capital stock. Ongoing debate over problems in ￿o¢ cial￿
Chinese data raises a variety of issues. We limit our discussion here to a few key issues relating
to GDP and ￿xed investment de￿ ators, employment, estimates of value-added in the state and
non-state sectors, as well as investment in the state and non-state sectors. We carry out the growth
accounting using a number of revised series, but also report results based on the o¢ cial data.
2.1 GDP De￿ ators
In China￿ s national income and product accounts, the aggregate economy is divided into three
sectors, primary, secondary (manufacturing plus construction, mining and utilities) and tertiary
(services). We will treat the primary sector as the agricultural sector and the sum of secondary
and tertiary sectors as the non-agricultural sector.
Much of the debate in the literature has been over sector-level GDP de￿ ators needed to convert
nominal GDP into real GDP. China￿ s implicit GDP de￿ ators have been criticized by Ren (1995),
7Young (2003) and Maddison (2007) for underestimating in￿ ation, and thus contributing to an
overestimate of real GDP growth. For the secondary sector, Holz (2006) provides a defence of their
internal consistency by comparing the changes in the implicit GDP de￿ ator with the prices of ￿nal
goods and that of raw materials and intermediates.
Following Ren (1995), Young (2003) proposes a set of alternatives: For the primary sector,
the farm and sideline products purchasing index, which rose 7.9% per annum between 1978 and
1998 compared to 8.5% by the implicit de￿ ator; for the secondary sector, the ex-factory industrial
price index, which increased 6.1% annually compared to 4.4% by the implicit de￿ ator; and for the
tertiary or services sector, the consumer service price index, which rose 10.7% per annum compared
to 7.1% by the implicit de￿ ator. It is important to note that all of these alternative de￿ ators are
￿nal goods de￿ ators, as opposed to value-added de￿ ators.
We carry out our analysis using the alternatives proposed by Ren and Young, with one mod-
i￿cation. We construct an alternative de￿ ator for services that re￿ ects the rising role of business
services, and di⁄erences in the behavior of the prices of business and consumer services. Young￿ s
alternative is based solely on the price of consumer services. Our new service price index implies a
rate of in￿ ation in between the implicit de￿ ator and Young￿ s alternative.
2.2 Fixed Investment De￿ ators
The National Bureau of Statistics in China (NBS) begins to report a ￿xed investment de￿ ator
only in 1991. For the period between 1978 and 1995, a de￿ ator for ￿xed capital formation can be
backed out of NBS-reported data on the nominal and real value of ￿xed capital formation. This
implicit de￿ ator, which shows an annual increase in the price of investment of 7.0 percent, has been
criticized for likely underestimating the rate of in￿ ation in capital formation.
Following the suggestion of Young (2003), Brandt and Rawski (2008) construct an alternative
de￿ ator for ￿xed investment spanning the longer period between 1952 and 2007 that is based on:
1) separate de￿ ators for equipment and structures; and 2) estimates of the percentage of total ￿xed
investment spending in structures and equipment. Comparing this alternative with the o¢ cial
de￿ ators, two things are noteworthy. First, the NBS ￿xed investment de￿ ator beginning in 1991
8and our alternative de￿ ator behave very similarly. Second, the implicit de￿ ator for gross ￿xed
capital formation shows much less in￿ ation than does our alternative. For the period between
1978 and 1995, the implicit index rises 7.0 percent per annum, compared to 10.2 annually by
the alternative. The most likely source of the di⁄erence is the failure of the implicit de￿ ator to
re￿ ect the rapidly rising costs of building and installation, and their in￿ uence on the costs of ￿xed
investment.
2.3 Employment
NBS provides estimates of total employment and a breakdown by sector: primary, secondary and
tertiary. Between 1978 and 2007, the NBS measure of employment increased from 401.5 million to
769.9 million. The NBS data also show a decline in the percentage of the labor force in the primary
sector from 70.5 percent in 1978 to 50 percent in 2000, and then to 40.8 percent in 2007.
There are two di¢ culties with the o¢ cial data. The ￿rst is a major discontinuity in the em-
ployment data beginning in 1990. This "break" re￿ ects a major upward adjustment to the NBS
employment series based on new information obtained from China￿ s population censuses of 1990
and 2000. These adjustments did not extend to years before 1990, leading to a big jump in the
NBS employment measure during 1989/1990.
A second issue concerns the possibility that NBS data underestimate the rate of decline in the
primary sector labor force (Rawski and Mead, 1998, Chen, 1992). Critics point to several potential
sources of this bias: the exclusion of employment in private and cooperative enterprises owned by
households prior to 1984 (Wong, 1988, p. 14); incomplete tabulation of self-employment and part-
time work outside agriculture by individuals who derived the bulk of their incomes from farming;
and erroneous inclusion of out-migrants in the farm labor force.
Following Holz (2006), we use information from the 1982 Census to adjust the pre-1990 data in
a way analogous to the adjustments made for 1990 and after. This results in an increase in the level
of employment in 1978, and a reduction in the rate of employment growth over the entire period.
We also construct an alternative estimate of primary sector employment by utilizing detailed labor
supply data for rural households disaggregated by activity collected by the Research Centre for
9Rural Economy as part of their annual rural household survey. These alternative estimates imply
a more rapid transfer of labor out of agriculture, especially in the early years of the introduction
of the household responsibility system (HRS) and rural reform. In absolute terms, employment
outside agriculture grew from 144 million in 1978 to 568 million in 2007. Moreover, by 2007, our
alternative estimates suggest that the percentage of the labor force in the primary sector had fallen
to 26.2 percent compared to 40.8 percent in the o¢ cial data.
2.4 Labor Productivity in the State and Non-state Non-agricultural Sectors
We will carry out growth accounting for the non-agricultural sector for the state and non-state
components, separately. NBS reports data on employment and capital formation disaggregated by
sector and ownership. They also decompose gross output and value-added in industry into the state
and non-state components, however they do not provide a similar breakdown for the remainder of
the secondary sector (construction plus public utilities) or for the tertiary sector. We utilize wage
data for the state and non-state sectors to estimate such a division for the entire non-agricultural
economy. To do this, we assume that wages are proportional to average value products, and that
labor shares in the state and non-state sectors are the same. Information on wages in the state
and non-state sector, the latter including urban collective, foreign-owned, private and township
and village enterprises, suggest that wages outside the state sector were between 60-70 percent of
state sector wages between 1978 and 1995, rose to nearly 85 percent by the late 1990s, and then
fell sharply to 66 percent by 2007.7
7These data conceal a potentially important complication: they include only cash compensation and neglect the
value of subsidies and in-kind wages enjoyed primarily by workers in the state sector, the largest component of which
was probably housing. Rawski (1982), Bannister (2004), and Benjamin et al (2008) o⁄er estimates of the magnitude
of these bene￿ts for various years. There is a consensus in the literature that the relative importance of such non-cash
bene￿ts has declined markedly over time, with estimates suggesting that they have fallen from rough equality with
cash wages in the late 1970s, to half of cash wages by the early 1990s, to perhaps a quarter of cash wages today.
These ￿gures imply that total compensation in the non-state sector increased relative to compensation in the state
sector twice as much between 1978 and 1998 as did cash wages. We examined the robustness of our results to revised
estimates of relative labor productivity based on this alternative wage series and found that the main results in the
paper remain unchanged.
102.5 Fixed Investment in the State and Non-state Non-agricultural Sectors
The NBS provides estimates of aggregate gross ￿xed capital formation and gross ￿xed investment
for years after 1978. The key di⁄erence between the two is that ￿xed investment data include
expenditure on land. These series are nearly indistinguishable throughout much of the period, but
after 2002 ￿xed investment increases more rapidly because of the growing importance of expenditure
on land. We need to obtain a breakdown between primary and non-primary, and in the non-primary
sector, state and non-state. We utilize the more detailed data on ￿xed investment expenditure, but
scale total investment expenditure to be consistent with the NBS estimates of gross ￿xed capital
formation.
Investment in the primary sector is made up of investment from three sources: state, collective
and households. The Fixed Investment Yearbooks provide estimates of investment in the primary
sector by both state-owned and collective units for the years 1981-2007. They also provide estimates
of total rural household investment, but do not break it down between primary and non-primary.
Assuming that investment is proportional to net income, we use additional information on the
percentage of total net business income from agriculture to obtain an estimate of household ￿xed
investment in agriculture. Our estimate of total primary investment is then the sum of our estimate
for rural households, plus the state and collective ￿xed investment.
Investment in the non-primary sector is calculated as total ￿xed investment less our investment
in the primary sector. We utilize the information on total state sector investment and state-sector
investment in the primary sector to obtain non-primary investment by the state sector. Beginning in
1993, the NBS begins to report separately ￿xed investment in shareholding companies, which were
typically medium-to-large SOEs that had been restructured, but in which the state still exercises
signi￿cant in￿ uence8. Our estimate of ￿xed investment in the state sector includes that by state-
owned ￿rms, plus shareholding companies. We also adjust for the privatization of state sector ￿rms
after 1998.
8On the basis of the 2004 Industrial Census, for example, there were 17,427 shareholding companies out of a total
of 1.37 million industrial ￿rms. These ￿rms however represented between 11 and 12 percent of total output and ￿xed
assets.
113 Simple Growth Accounting by Sectors
Following the standard growth accounting practice, we assume Cobb-Douglas production technolo-










Here, Yit is GDP, Lit employment, and Kit capital stock in sector i (i = a, agriculture, s, state and
ns non-state non-agriculture), respectively. ￿ is the factor share of labor, which is assumed to be
the same in all three sectors.
On the basis of the national income accounts for China and the national input-output tables
constructed by the NBS, the labor share in non-agriculture has remained roughly 0.5. These ac-
counts put the labor share for the entire economy at 0.58-0.60, which implies a share for agriculture
of nearly 0.7. Moreover, the falling contribution of agriculture in GDP since 1978 means that
the share of labor in agriculture has been rising over time. The high and rising share of labor in
agriculture is inconsistent with estimates made on the basis of household data, which suggest a
labor share in the vicinity of 0.50. For all three sectors, then, we assume that the labor share is 0.5
throughout the period of our study.
The capital stock in agriculture consists of land only. We assume that the land endowment in
agriculture is ￿xed over time and normalize it to one. As a result, our estimate of TFP growth in
agriculture may partially re￿ ect changes in either the land endowment or land quality. Also note
that when we calculate TFPs we do not control for the levels of human capital. Thus, the TFP
di⁄erences over time and across sectors may also re￿ ect di⁄erences in human capital.
Using the revised data series described above, we carry out the standard growth accounting
exercise for the entire economy, the non-primary sector, and within the non-primary sector, the
state and non-state sectors separately. In each case, we do the analysis for the full period, and then
split the period into three decades: 1978-1988, 1988-1998 and 1998-2007. We report the results of
12this simple growth accounting in Table 1. In the appendix, we compare these results with those
using ￿o¢ cial￿price de￿ ators and employment and the results from the literature.
Table 1 here
Our benchmark data imply a rate of growth in the aggregate real output per worker of 7.6
percent per annum. Over the entire 29-year period, the contributions to growth of capital deepening
and TFP are fairly evenly divided, 3.7 percent versus 3.9, or 49 and 51 percent of total growth,
respectively. Splitting the data into sub-periods reveals an increase in the rate of growth of output
per work in the last decade resulting from both more rapid capital accumulation and faster TFP
growth.
In the non-agricultural sector, output per worker grows less rapidly over the entire period
than we observe in the aggregate, a product of both lower TFP growth and less rapid capital
accumulation per worker. Between 1978 and 2007, output per worker in the non-agricultural sector
grows 2.2 percent and TFP 3.2 percent. Note however the increase in the rate of growth over
time and the growing contribution of capital deepening. Early in the reform, rapid growth in the
non-agricultural labor force contributed to a decline in the capital-labor ratio in the non-agriculture
sector. All of the growth in output per worker was coming from TFP growth. In contrast, capital
deepening became more important in the non-agricultural sector for the last two decades.
The aggregate estimates conceal stark di⁄erences between the non-state and state sectors. Over
the entire period, TFP growth in the non-state sector was three times that in the state sector. This
was o⁄set by much slower growth in capital per worker so that output per work in the two sectors
grew at fairly similar rates. Only in the last decade, through massive reorganization and layo⁄s,
did the state sector￿ s TFP growth became comparable to that in the non-state sector.
Figure 3 plots the TFP levels for the three sectors.9 There has been signi￿cant growth of TFP
in agriculture and the non-state non-agricultural sector, which increased at annual rates of 6.20
9The TFP level in agriculture is not comparable to the TFP levels in the two non-agricultural sectors because
of di⁄erences in the production technologies. In Figure 3, we normalize the initial levels of the agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors￿TFP to one. The TFP levels within the non-agricultural sector, namely, those of the state
and the non-state sector, however, are directly comparable.
13and 4.56 percent, respectively. By comparison, TFP growth in the state sector has been relatively
sluggish, increasing only at the rate of 1.52 percent per annum. In terms of levels, in 1978 TFP in
the non-state non-agriculture sector was nearly the same as that in the state sector. Due to the
more rapid growth in the non-state sector, TFP levels diverge over time, with the gap peaking in
2000 at 125 percent.
Figure 3 here
4 A Three Sector Model of Structural Transformation and Growth
Given the large di⁄erences in TFP across the three sectors, reallocations of resources across sectors
are potentially important sources for the growth in the aggregate productivity. However, these
reallocations are also likely to be a function of the TFP di⁄erences across sectors as well as labor
market frictions. To fully account for the contribution of sector TFPs and the reallocation across
sectors, a model of sectoral reallocation is needed. Also, as is well known, using the simple growth
accounting to gauge the importance of capital accumulation to growth is problematic because its
contribution depends on the TFP growth. (Without TFP growth, the rapid increase in the capital
to labor ratio would have resulted in a declining contribution of capital deepening due to diminishing
returns.) To better assess the contribution of a rising investment rate to growth, we need to use a
model that takes into account the impact of TFP growth on the contribution of capital deepening.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic model with three sectors: agriculture, non-state non-
agriculture and state. There are two goods in the economy, agricultural and non-agricultural. The
agricultural good is produced in the agriculture sector and the non-agricultural good is produced
by both the non-state non-agriculture and state sectors. The production technologies were given in
equation (1)-(3). The capital stock in the agricultural sector (land) is assume to be a constant Z.
Preferences: In each period, the representative household consumes an agricultural good and a
non-agricultural good. Preferences are summarized by the following utility function:
141 X
t=0
￿t [aln(cat ￿ c) + (1 ￿ a)ln(cnt)]; 0 < a < 1; 0 < ￿ < 1.
Here, cat and cnt are the amounts of agricultural and non-agricultural goods the household
consumes in period t, respectively, c > 0 is the subsistence consumption of the agricultural good.
The representative household￿ s consumption allocation problem is
max
cat;cnt
aln(cat ￿ c) + (1 ￿ a)ln(cnt)
subject to
patcat + pntcnt = (1 ￿ st)ym
t
where st is the investment rate, ym
t is the nominal income, pit is the price of good i, i = a;n. The
optimal consumption allocation is given by the following equations:










Exogenous investment rate and investment e¢ ciency:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It=￿t;
It = st(patYat + Ynt):
Here st is the investment rate, and ￿t is a variable that is inversely related to the e¢ ciency of
converting the non-agriculture good into the capital good. Both are taken as exogenous.
Frictions in the Labor Market:
We consider two kinds of labor market frictions. First, the level of employment and wage in
the state sector are set by the government rather than determined by the market. Over the years,
the Chinese government has kept the average wage in the state sector at levels that are higher
15than those in the non-state sector. Second, there are many institutional and policy constraints that
restrict movement of labor from agriculture. Although di¢ cult to measure directly, they generally
have the e⁄ect of depressing the returns to labor in agriculture relative to those in non-agriculture.
Thus, the wedge in returns to labor between agriculture and non-agriculture can be used as an
implicit measure of the barriers to labor reallocation between the two sectors. We denote this
wedge by ￿t.
Let ￿t be the wage premium in the state sector and ￿t be the wedge in wages between the
agricultural sector and the non-state non-agricultural sector. Then, we have
wat = (1 ￿ ￿t)wnst; (6)
wst = (1 + ￿t)wnst: (7)
Here, wit is a wage in sector i in period t. Let ’st = Lst=Lnt be the state sector￿ s share of non-
agricultural labor force, which we assume is an exogenous variable that is set by the government.





which is increasing in ￿t, ￿t and ’st.
We do not have direct data on the average returns to labor in the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. However, we do have data on the average value product of labor (or nominal
output per worker) for the two sectors. Under the assumption that labor shares of income are the
same in the two sectors, the gap in the average value product of labor equals the gap in average
returns to labor and therefore can be used as a measure of ￿t.
Figure 4 plots this measure of labor market barriers. Between 1978 and 1984, the gap in average
returns to labor between agriculture and non-agriculture declined sharply, from 83 percent to 52
percent. Subsequently, the gap widened, and in 2007 was equal to 65 percent. Figure 4 also plots
the three components of the average wage gap: ￿t, the gap in wages between the agriculture and the
non-state non-agriculture sector; ￿t, the gap in wages between the non-state and the state sector or
16the state sector￿ s wage premium; and ’st the size of the state sector measured by the share of the
state sector￿ s share of non-agricultural employment. While the behavior of the ￿rst component is
very similar to the overall gap, the second component ￿ uctuates and the third component declines
steadily over time.
Figure 4 here
4.1 Share of Labor Force in Agriculture
Using the market clearing condition for the agricultural good and the facts that wages equal mar-
ginal value products of labor in each sector, we can derive the employment share of labor in
agriculture10:
lat =
(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ ￿t)






1 ￿ ￿t + a(1 ￿ st)￿t
: (9)
Equation (9) will be the basis for calibration and predicting agriculture￿ s share of total employment.
It identi￿es three potential sources for reallocation of labor from agriculture: (1) increases in
agricultural productivity that relax a subsistence food consumption constraint; (2) a reduction in
barriers to labor mobility between sectors; and (3) increases in the investment rate.
4.2 Capital Allocation in the Non-Agricultural Sector
The barriers to labor mobility not only a⁄ect the reallocation of labor across sectors, they also
in￿ uence the allocation of capital across sectors and therefore growth in non-agriculture and the
whole economy. From the labor market condition (7) we have
￿AstL￿￿1
st K1￿￿





















































In contrast, if capital is allowed to allocate freely across the two sectors so that the marginal










That is, the share of capital that is allocated to the state sector would be decreasing rather than
increasing in the productivity gap between the two sectors, Anst=Ast.
When Anst > Ast, more resources should be allocated to the non-state sector. However, main-
taining a large share of employment with a wage premium in the state sector implies that more
capital needs to be allocated to the state sector rather than the non-state sector. So, the share of
capital that is allocated to the state sector is increasing in ￿t, ’st and the productivity gap between
the state and the non-state sector, Anst=Ast. In other words, distortions in the labor market are
supported by distortions in capital allocation. In the quantitative analysis below, we will show that
such distortions have a signi￿cant impact on growth.
184.3 TFP in the Non-agricultural Sector and the Aggregate
From (10) and (11), we have






























which is a weighted geometric average of the two sector￿ s TFPs, with the weights being the em-
ployment shares of the two sector. Since the TFP in the state sector has been lower than that in
the non-state sector, the larger the share of the state sector￿ s employment, the lower the TFP in
the non-agricultural sector. Therefore, a potential source of TFP growth in the non-agricultural
sector is the reduction in the state sector￿ s share of employment. For ￿t > 0, we can rewrite the
TFP of the non-agricultural sector as follows:
Ant =
1 + ’st￿t h

















1 ￿ ’st + ’st(1 + ￿t)
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1￿￿









19Note that, by Jensen￿ s inequality,
h




> 1 ￿ ’st + ’st(1 + ￿t) = 1 + ’st￿t;
and therefore
1 + ’st￿t h
1 ￿ ’st + ’st(1 + ￿t)
1
1￿￿
i1￿￿ < 1: (14)
We can see from equation (13) and inequality (14) the impact of the wage premium ￿t on the TFP
in the non-agriculture sector. First, TFP in the non-agricultural sector will still be proportional to
a weighted average of the TFPs in the two sectors, but with a higher weight now on the state sector.
In addition, the wage premium introduces a further distortion in resource allocation across the two
sectors such that the TFP in the non-agricultural sector is smaller than the weighted average of the
TFPs in the two sectors. Thus, an added potential source of the TFP growth in the non-agricultural
sector is the reduction in the state sector￿ s wage premium. In summary, the state sector￿ s wage
premium ￿t and the employment share ’st both have negative impacts on non-agricultural TFP if
the TFP in the non-state sector is higher than that in the state sector.
As for the aggregate TFP, we have
yt = p￿




t (1 ￿ lat)￿:
Here zt = Z=Lt is land per capita, Ant is the TFP in the non-agricultural sector, which is given
by equation (13), and p￿
a is the relative price of agricultural output in the base year. Following
the standard growth accounting exercises, the growth of output per worker in the aggregate is
decomposed into two parts: growth in physical capital per worker kt, and the growth in aggregate
TFP. That is yt = Atk1￿￿
t . Thus, the expression for the measured aggregate TFP in our model is




at + Ant(1 ￿ lat)￿; (15)
where the TFP in the non-agricultural sector is given by equation (13). Note how various "sectoral"
20factors contribute to the measured aggregate TFP. First, TFP growth in any of the three sectors,
agriculture, non-state non-agriculture and state sector, contributes positively to the aggregate TFP
growth. Second, if there is a positive TFP gap between the non-agricultural and agricultural
sectors, the reallocation of labor away from agriculture also leads to aggregate TFP growth. Third,
reduction in the state sector￿ s share of employment and wage premium also contribute positively
to the aggregate TFP growth through two channels: increasing the TFP in the non-agricultural
sector and facilitating faster reallocation of labor away from agriculture.
4.4 Calibration of the Model
As we discussed in the section on TFP, the labor share has been approximately 50 percent in both
the aggregate and the non-agriculture sector in China. So we set ￿ to 0:5. We use equation (9)
to calibrate the values of the other two parameters, a and c. We normalize the value of Z to one.
Given the values of Aat we calculated in section 3 and the values of ￿t and st, which are taken
directly from the data, we choose the values of a and c so that in the beginning and ending years
of the period, 1978 and 2007, agriculture￿ s share of employment implied by equation (9) matches
that in the data. The calibrated values for a and c are 0.147 and 0.475, respectively. Figure 5 plots
the employment shares of agriculture implied by the calibrated model and their counterparts in the
data, and Table 2 compares the labor productivity and TFP growth rates predicted by the model
to their counterparts in the data.
Figure 5 and Table 2 here
4.5 Driving Forces of Reallocation of Labor from Agriculture
Our model identi￿es three potential sources for the reallocation of labor from agriculture: (1)
increases in agricultural productivity that relax a subsistence food consumption constraint; (2) a
reduction in barriers to labor mobility between sectors; and (3) increases in the aggregate investment
rate. The potential relevance of each of these three sources in the Chinese context is discussed in
detail by Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu (2008). To evaluate the quantitative importance of these three
factors. we use our calibrated model to conduct a series of counter-factual exercises, each of which
21removes one of the factors driving labor reallocation. Table 3 summarizes the results of these
calculations.11
Table 3 here
The TFP growth in agriculture is clearly the most important factor. For the other two forces, the
reduction in barriers is important in the ￿rst decade of the reform during which many restrictions
on non-farming activities in the rural areas were removed, while the increase in the investment rate
played only a marginal role for the entire period.
5 Model Based Growth Accounting
We now turn to the quanti￿cation of growth contributions of various factors, including
1. The increases in the investment rate;
2. TFP growth within each of the three sectors;
3. Inter-sectoral reallocation of labor and capital from low TFP sectors to high TFP sectors.
We estimate the contribution of each prospective source of growth by eliminating its in￿ uence
from the benchmark model and then comparing the resulting outcome with that from the bench-
mark model. For example, to investigate how much TFP growth in the non-state sector contributed
to overall growth, we conduct a counter-factual experiment that imposes a constant TFP in the
non-state sector throughout 1978-2007 and let the model determine the paths and rates of growth
of the aggregate TFP and aggregate labor productivity. We then take the di⁄erences between these
hypothetical growth rates and the growth rates from the benchmark model as our estimates of the
contribution of the TFP growth in the non-state sector to overall TFP and labor productivity
11Note that because the di⁄erent factors contribute to labor reallocation in a non-linear fashion, their contributions
are not additive. That is, the combined contribution to the labor reallocation may be higher or lower than the sum
of the contributions by individual factors, depending on their interactions.
22growth. Table 4 provides the results from these counter-factual exercises for the entire 29-year
period and Table 5 reports the results for the three sub-periods.12 We discuss the results reported
in the tables below.
Table 4 and 5 here
5.1 Contributions of Sector TFP growth
5.1.1 TFP growth in agriculture
In agriculture, where land is essentially ￿xed and the quantity of capital remains modest, the impact
of TFP growth on labor productivity in agriculture is enormous: Without it, labor productivity
in agriculture would have actually declined at an annual rate of -0.74 percent, compared to the
7.02 percent annual growth in the benchmark model and in the data. As we discussed in the last
section, TFP growth in farming is also an important driving force for the reallocation of labor out
of agriculture. Because of the higher productivity in the non-agricultural sector, the reallocation
also contributed indirectly to the growth of the aggregate TFP. The combined contribution of these
two e⁄ects is a 1.5 percent increase in the growth rates of both the aggregate TFP and aggregate
labour productivity.
Given the remarkable 6.2 percent growth rate of the agricultural TFP, it￿ s contribution to
aggregate growth￿ including the direct e⁄ect through labor productivity growth within agriculture
and indirect e⁄ect through reallocation of labor￿ is relatively modest. Assuming no TFP growth
in agriculture, aggregate labor productivity would have still grown at a robust rate of 5.76. An
important reason for this modest contribution is that agriculture￿ s share of GDP was already below
30 percent in 1978. By 2007, it fell to less than half of this. As a result, growth in that sector
exercised only weak in￿ uence on the path of the economy-wide labor productivity.
12Again, the contributions of individual factors are not necessarily additive because they may in￿ uence the aggregate
growth in a non-linear fashion.
235.1.2 TFP growth in the non-state sector
Employment in the non-state sector grew by more than 420 million, while its share of total em-
ployment jumped from 14.8 percent to 64.4 percent between 1978 and 2007. Despite this rapid
increase, labor productivity grew at an impressive 5.37 percent annual rate. Because of the non-
state sector￿ s limited access to capital, labor productivity and TFP, which shows annual growth
of 4.56 percent during 1978-2007, are closely linked. If there had been no TFP growth in the
non-state sector, the rapid increase in employment would drive labor productivity growth rates in
the non-state sector and the non-agriculture sector to 1.14 percent and 0.35 percent, respectively.
Without the TFP growth in the non-state sector, there would have been virtually no TFP growth
in the non-agriculture sector (0.09 percent) and a much lower TFP growth rate in the aggregate
(1.68 percent). Overall, the aggregate labor productivity growth rate would have been 3.46 percent
instead of 7.16 percent, a more than 50% reduction. In addition, without the TFP growth in the
non-state sector, less capital would have been accumulated in the economy. As a result, the state
sector, which relies heavily on capital accumulation for growth, would see its labor productivity
growth rate reduced from 5.48 percent to 0.83 percent, a reduction of 4.65 percentage points.
5.1.3 TFP growth in the state sector
Consistent with extensive empirical work on the experience in industry (Je⁄erson and Rawski, 1999;
Groves et. al. 1994), we ￿nd only modest growth of TFP in the state sector, especially through the
late 1990s. Although it is signi￿cantly lower than that in the non-state sector, this growth in TFP
is moderately important. If TFP in the state sector had not grown, the drag of the state sector
on overall growth would have been even larger as state enterprises would have absorbed an even
larger portion of China￿ s capital formation in order to maintain its employment and wage premiums.
Overall, stagnation of state-sector TFP would have reduced the non-agricultural TFP growth rate to
2.15 percent and the aggregate TFP growth rate to 3.04 percent. The labor productivity in the non-
agriculture sector and the aggregate would have been 3.68 percent and 6.08 percent, respectively.
245.2 Contributions of Labor Reallocations
5.2.1 Reallocation of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture
As we have seen, three factors in￿ uenced the reallocation of labor from agriculture: TFP growth in
agriculture, a reduction in labor market barriers, and increases in the investment rate. In addition
to promoting labor reallocation, each of these factors also has a direct e⁄ect on growth. To isolate
the pure impact of labor reallocation from agriculture to non-agriculture, we conduct a counter-
factual exercise in which we simply force the share of employment in agriculture to remain at the
1978 level. In this case, none of the growth would have been due to the reallocation between
agriculture and non-agriculture.
In this counter-factual exercise, the growth rate of agricultural labor productivity falls to 6.28
percent compared to 7.25 percent, leaving agriculture to absorb more labor under conditions of
sharply diminishing returns (i.e. adding more workers to the farm sector depresses labor produc-
tivity). The absence of labor in￿ ows from the farm sector would actually increase the growth rate
of labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector from 5.00 percent to 6.59 percent. There is a
third e⁄ect related to the elimination of labor reallocation: economy-wide average labor produc-
tivity is now lower because a larger percentage of employment is allocated to the sector with lower
productivity.
Taking all these three e⁄ects into account, eliminating the transfer of labor across the two
sectors would reduce the annual growth rate of aggregate labor productivity from 7.25 percent to
6.28 percent, a modest reduction of 0.97 percentage points per year. So, this experiment with our
dynamic model shows that the reallocation of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture had three
impacts on growth: higher labor productivity growth in agriculture, lower labor productivity growth
in non-agriculture, and more e¢ cient labor allocation across sectors. Overall, they translate into a
very modest increase of 0.97 percentage points in the growth rate of aggregate labor productivity.
The impact on the aggregate TFP growth is slightly larger, a 1.04 percentage point reduction, from
3.95 percent to 2.91 percent. Most of the gains from the reallocation came during the ￿rst decade
of reform.
25Other authors have used a simple decomposition to quantify the contribution of the labor
reallocation from agriculture and generally ￿nd a much larger role than what our model implies13.
In the appendix we compare our model-based accounting to the simple decomposition and explain
why the results obtained from the simple decomposition are likely to be biased.
5.2.2 Reallocation of Labor from State to Non-state Sector
To quantify the contribution of the second structural transformation, i.e. the reallocation of labor
from state to non-state sector, we do a counter-factual simulation that is similar to the one we
described above. Instead of keeping agriculture￿ s employment share constant, we let the state
sector￿ s share of non-agricultural employment remain at its 1978 level. Under this scenario, growth
of aggregate labor productivity falls to 5.64 percent a year, or 1.59 percentage points lower than
the 7.25 percent growth rate observed in the data. The contribution of this reallocation is smaller
in the ￿rst sub-period than the latter two sub-periods. The contribution to overall growth of
reallocation of labor from state to non-state is 1.09 percentage points between 1978 and 1988, but
1.50 percentage points between 1988 and 1998, and 2.31 percentage points between 1998 and 2007.
This is not surprising given that most of the reallocation of labor from the state to the non-state
sector occurred in the last two sub-periods.
5.3 Contribution of the Increases in the Investment Rate
As a result of the reallocation of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture and general increases in
total employment, output in the non-agricultural sector grew rapidly. Although the investment rate
has generally moved upward, capital accumulation did not catch up with the rapid employment
growth in the non-agricultural sector in the ￿rst 10 years or so. Before 1991, the capital-labor
ratio in the non-agricultural sector actually remained below its 1978 level, as non-agricultural
employment grew faster than the corresponding capital stock. The last two decades, however, the
13See, for example, OECD (2005), pg. 32, which performs similar calculations in the context of three-sector model
for period 1983-2003. They ￿nd that a ￿fth or so of the overall growth was due to sectoral reallocations of labor, and
suggest the contribution could have been even larger in light of di⁄erences in the marginal (as opposed to average)
products of labor. See also Bosworth and Collins (2008).
26rate of investment increased dramatically, which lead to a tripling in the capital-labor ratio in the
non-agricultural sector.
To quantify the impact of the increase in the rate of investment, we conduct a counter-factual
experiment in which investment is assumed to remain at 21 percent of GDP throughout the 29-
year period. The reduction in the investment rate would have no e⁄ect on the TFP in the non-
agricultural sector and a slightly positive e⁄ect on the TFP in the aggregate. The aggregate labor
productivity growth rate, however, would have been reduced to 5.88 percent, a 1.37 percentage
point reduction. Due to the diminishing returns to capital, however, the importance of capital
accumulation declines over time. In the period between 1998 and 2007, if the investment rate had
remained at its 1998 level, 33 percent of GDP, the aggregate labor productivity growth rate would
have been reduced by only 0.78 percentage point.
5.4 Potential Gains from Eliminating Capital Market Distortions
While the reallocation of labor from the state to non-state sector has contributed signi￿cantly to
the overall growth in China, the gains could have been even larger if not for the distortions in the
capital market. Despite the signi￿cant reduction in the state sector￿ s share of employment and the
substantial gains to the economy from the reallocation, the state sector continues to be a drag on
the overall growth in the economy. Figure 6 plots the returns to capital in the state and the non-
state sector and the capital-labor ratios for the two sectors, respectively. Note the enormous gap
in the returns to capital between the two sectors that persists through 2007. Yet, the capital-labor
ratio in the state sector has increased much faster than that in the non-state sector. This rise in
the capital to labor ratio is a result of the government￿ s policy of continuing to support the state
sector in spite of the widening gap in TFP levels between the state and the non-state sector. While
the investment rate in China is high, a signi￿cant portion of the investment is in the less e¢ cient
state sector where the return to capital is close to zero. Even as late as 2007, more than 50 percent
of ￿xed investment was going to the state sector, broadly de￿ned. At the same time, too little
investment has gone to the non-state sector where the returns to capital have hovered around 55
percent.
27Figure 6 here
To quantify the potential gains from more e¢ cient capital allocation, we conduct a counter-
factual exercise in which the capital is allowed to ￿ ow freely between the state and the non-state
sectors so that the two sectors￿returns to capital are equalized. In this case, the annual growth
rates of the aggregate TFP and labor productivity would have increased by 0.82 percent and 1.58
percent, respectively, for the entire 29-year period.
The misallocation of capital has also made the economy￿ s growth more dependent on the increase
in capital intensity. Between 1978 and 2007, the aggregate investment rate increased from 21 percent
to around 40 percent of GDP. As we discussed earlier, without the increase in the investment rate,
aggregate labor productivity growth rate would have been reduced by 1.37 percentage points. If
capital had been allowed to ￿ ow freely between the state and the non-state sectors, however, the
growth rate would have increased by 0.06 percentage points. In other words, absent capital market
distortions, China could have achieved the same growth performance without any increase in the
aggregate investment rate.
As can be seen from Figure 6, the gap in returns to capital between the state and the non-
state sectors has been widening over time, suggesting an increase in capital market distortions in
recent years. This is in contrast to the distortions in the labor market, which have declined over
time. Re￿ ecting the increasing capital market distortions in the recent decade, the growth e⁄ect of
capital accumulation diminishes and the potential gains from eliminating the distortions are even
larger in the last decade. If there had been no increase in the investment rate between 1998 to
2007, aggregate labor productivity growth rate would have only been reduced by 0.78 percentage
points per annum during this period. However, if we maintain the aggregate investment rate at the
1998 level but allow capital to be allocated e¢ ciently between the state and the non-state sectors,
the aggregate TFP and labor productivity growth would have increased by 2.63 percent and 3.64
percent per annum, respectively. (See Table 5.)
285.5 Robustness
5.5.1 Simulation Results from the O¢ cial Data
So far we have focused our discussions of the model-based accounting using the benchmark data
set. Most of the results do not change much when we conduct the exercises using the o¢ cial data.
Most important, it remains true that the TFP growth in the non-state sector and the reallocation
of labor from the state to the non-state are the two largest contributors to aggregate TFP and
labor productivity growth, and that there are potentially substantial gains from eliminating capital
market distortions. Table 6 presents the main results using both our revised data and the o¢ cial
data.
5.5.2 Incorporating Infrastructure Capital
Some may argue that the gap in returns to capital between the state and the non-state sectors
are overestimated because some of the investments in the state sector are for infrastructure. It is
possible that these infrastructure investments have helped to increase the output in the non-state
sector and the total returns to these investments have not been fully captured by the output in the
state sector. To deal with this issue, in the appendix we consider a modi￿cation of our benchmark
model that incorporates infrastructure capital into our analysis.
Figure 7 shows the returns to capital and the capital-labor ratios in the state and the non-state
sectors after we adjust for infrastructure capital. Even after we exclude infrastructure capital from
the capital in the state sector, the capital-labor ratio in the sector is still signi￿cantly higher than
that in the non-state sector and a large gap in returns to capital remains between the two sectors.
We also carried out counter-factual simulations based on the model with infrastructure capital.
The results are summarized in Table 7. While this model does not match the data as well as the
benchmark model, its implications for the sources of growth are the same as those of the benchmark
model. In particular, it still suggests that TFP growth in the non-state sector has been the most
important source of the growth and the potential gain from eliminating capital market distortions
is large.
296 Conclusion
There has been continued debate over the sources of China￿ s remarkable growth over the last three
decades. Some have argued that the reallocation of labor from agriculture and the rising investment
rate rather than improvements in TFP are the key sources of the growth. In this paper, we construct
a dynamic three-sector model that allows us to quantitatively assess the contributions of various
factors to aggregate TFP and labor productivity growth in China. The key to our analysis is
distinguishing between the state and non-state components within the non-agricultural sector.
We ￿nd that the contributions of the reallocation of labor from agriculture and the rising
investment rate are modest. The most important sources of growth are the rapid growth of TFP in
the non-state non-agriculture sector and the reallocation of labor and other resources out of the state
sector and into the non-state sector. Our analysis helps to corroborate the view that rapidly rising
productivity growth within the non-agriculture sector has been a key driver of China￿ s economic
success, and suggests the need in future analysis to get inside the black box and identify the sources
of this growth.
While institutional constraints on resource mobility have weakened signi￿cantly, our analysis
also highlights the continued cost of the state sector. Even as late as 2007, more than half of
all resources for investment went to the state sector. Analysis at the aggregate level misses this
stark contrast in behavior between the state and non-state sectors, and the role of the dynamism
in the non-state sector in absorbing more than 420 million workers. Signi￿cant gains exist from
further reallocation of resources from the state sector, especially the re-direction of investment
from the state to non-state sector. Perhaps this should be the focus of China￿ s growth rebalancing
strategy rather than a shift from investment to consumption as emphasized by many. In fact, our
analysis shows that redirecting investment from the state to non-state sector has the potential of
helping China to restore the balance between investment and consumption while maintaining the
remarkable growth performance it experienced in the last three decades.
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Aggregate   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
         
Output per worker 7.58 6.77 6.40 9.79
   capital per worker 3.66 2.58 3.35 5.21
   TFP 3.92 4.19 3.05 4.58
Non‐agricultural 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 5.37 2.52 5.28 8.65
   capital per worker 2.15 ‐0.30 2.69 4.27
   TFP 3.22 2.81 2.59 4.38
Non‐State   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 6.16 3.91 6.40 8.39
   capital per worker 1.60 ‐2.39 3.23 4.21
   TFP 4.56 6.30 3.17 4.18
State   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 5.85 3.32 3.69 11.06
   capital per worker 4.33 2.62 3.74 6.88
   TFP 1.52 0.70 ‐0.05 4.19
The calculations here use the alternative deflators for both GDP and the capital stock, 
and the revised data on total employment and the share in agriculture.Table 2. Comparison of Model's Predictions to Data (1978‐2007)
Change in agriculture's  Labor Productivity Growth   TFP Growth
share of employment ya yns ys yn y An A
Data ‐0.43 7.02 6.16 5.85 5.37 7.58 3.22 3.92
  









Reduction in agriculture's share  1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
of employment due to: 
TFP growth in agriculture 39 19 13 6
Reduction in barriers 14 17 ‐2 ‐1
Increase in investment rate 6 3 1 2Table 4. Model‐based growth accounting: Results from counter‐factual simulations for the period  1978‐2007
  Change in agriculture's                                       Labor Productivity Growth                      TFP growth
 employment  share agriculture NSOEs SOEs non-agriculture aggregate non-agriculture aggregate
Benchmark Model ‐0.43 7.02 5.79 5.48 5.00 7.25 3.22 3.95
Counterfactuals: 
     No TFP growth in agriculture ‐0.04 ‐0.74 7.08 6.78 6.30 5.76 3.22 2.45
     No reduction in barriers ‐0.29 6.27 2.98 2.98 2.98 5.04 2.02 2.94
         No reduction in ag-nonstate wage gap ‐0.34 6.50 5.76 5.45 4.97 6.86 3.22 3.84
         No reduction in state emplyment share ‐0.40 6.83 3.46 3.16 3.27 5.64 2.11 3.04
         No reduction in state wage premium ‐0.43 7.01 5.35 5.35 4.63 6.90 3.09 3.85
     No TFP growth in non-state sector ‐0.43 7.02 1.14 0.83 0.35 3.46 0.09 1.68
     No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.43 7.02 4.46 4.16 3.68 6.08 2.15 3.04
     No reallocation btw ag and non-ag 0.00 5.34 7.38 7.07 6.59 6.28 3.22 2.91
     No capital market distortion ‐0.43 7.02 7.50 1.43 6.71 8.83 4.17 4.77
     No increase in investment rate ‐0.37 6.67 4.46 4.15 3.68 5.88 3.22 4.06
         and no capital market distortion ‐0.37 6.67 6.11 0.04 5.33 7.31 4.17 4.79Table 5. Model‐based growth accounting: Results from counter‐factual simulations for the three sub‐periods
1978-1988 Change in agriculture's                                        Labor Productivity Growth                      TFP growth
 employment  share agriculture NSOEs SOEs non-agriculture aggregate non-agriculture aggregate
Benchmark Model ‐0.29 6.24 2.98 2.40 1.59 6.59 2.81 4.53
Counterfactuals: 
     No TFP growth in agriculture ‐0.10 ‐0.67 5.02 4.43 3.63 4.60 2.81 2.42
     No reduction in barriers ‐0.12 4.54 1.02 1.02 1.02 3.88 1.83 3.03
         No reduction in ag-nonstate wage gap ‐0.15 4.79 3.57 2.98 2.18 5.20 2.81 3.86
         No reduction in state emplyment share ‐0.27 6.03 0.90 0.32 0.53 5.50 1.97 3.80
         No reduction in state wage premium ‐0.28 6.20 2.43 2.43 1.27 6.27 2.62 4.37
     No TFP growth in non-state sector ‐0.29 6.24 ‐0.38 ‐0.97 ‐1.77 3.85 0.07 2.41
     No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.29 6.24 2.96 2.38 1.57 6.58 2.30 4.02
     No reallocation btw ag and non-ag 0.00 3.58 6.62 6.03 5.23 4.79 2.81 2.37
     No capital market distortion ‐0.29 6.24 7.55 ‐3.64 4.41 9.02 4.73 6.06
     No increase in investment rate since 1978 ‐0.26 5.92 2.00 1.42 0.61 5.45 2.81 4.60
         and no capital market distortion ‐0.26 5.92 6.44 ‐4.75 3.31 7.71 4.73 6.08
1988-1998 Change in agriculture's                                        Labor Productivity Growth                      TFP growth
 employment  share agriculture NSOEs SOEs non-agriculture aggregate non-agriculture aggregate
Benchmark Model ‐0.08 7.40 6.17 3.46 5.05 6.16 2.59 3.05
Counterfactuals: 
     No TFP growth in agriculture 0.05 ‐1.02 7.49 4.79 6.37 4.50 2.59 1.34
     No reduction in barriers ‐0.10 7.24 1.50 1.50 1.50 4.05 0.25 1.75
         No reduction in ag-nonstate wage gap ‐0.13 7.62 5.36 2.65 4.24 6.35 2.59 3.47
         No reduction in state emplyment share ‐0.09 7.46 4.73 2.03 3.13 4.66 1.12 1.93
         No reduction in state wage premium ‐0.07 7.19 4.15 4.15 3.71 4.90 1.34 1.99
     No TFP growth in non-state sector ‐0.08 7.40 2.00 ‐0.71 0.88 2.87 ‐0.19 1.16
     No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.08 7.40 5.52 2.82 4.40 5.61 2.67 3.23
     No reallocation btw ag and non-ag 0.00 6.28 6.88 4.17 5.76 5.89 2.59 2.72
     No capital market distortion ‐0.08 7.40 6.10 ‐0.34 6.15 7.18 3.20 3.58
     No increase in investment rate since 1988 ‐0.07 7.25 6.00 3.29 4.88 5.91 2.59 3.04
         and no capital market distortion ‐0.07 7.25 11.75 ‐8.05 8.38 8.95 5.20 5.20
1998-2007 Change in agriculture's                                        Labor Productivity Growth                      TFP growth
employment share agriculture NSOEs SOEs non-agriculture aggregate non-agriculture aggregate
Benchmark Model ‐0.06 7.48 8.48 11.15 8.74 9.18 4.38 4.32
Counterfactuals: 
     No TFP growth in agriculture 0.00 ‐0.52 8.93 11.60 9.18 8.46 4.38 3.73
     No reduction in barriers ‐0.07 7.11 6.81 6.81 6.81 7.44 4.19 4.14
         No reduction in ag-nonstate wage gap ‐0.06 7.16 8.63 11.30 8.88 9.29 4.38 4.22
         No reduction in state emplyment share ‐0.04 7.02 4.90 7.57 6.47 6.87 3.36 3.41
         No reduction in state wage premium ‐0.08 7.70 9.94 9.94 9.36 9.80 5.54 5.35
     No TFP growth in non-state sector ‐0.06 7.48 1.87 4.54 2.13 3.67 0.42 1.46
     No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.06 7.48 4.95 7.62 5.21 6.05 1.41 1.74
     No reallocation btw ag and non-ag 0.00 6.25 8.78 11.45 9.04 8.38 4.38 3.72
     No capital market distortion ‐0.06 7.48 9.01 9.03 9.90 10.44 4.62 4.65
     No increase in investment rate since 1998 ‐0.04 7.01 7.91 10.58 8.17 8.40 4.38 4.29
         and no capital market distortion ‐0.04 7.01 14.53 ‐4.45 12.92 12.72 7.53 6.99Table 6. Counterfactual simulations using alternative data sets
                                                                    Change in Agirculture's Employment Share                                                                   Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Rate
Benchmark Data 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Calibrated Model ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 7.25 6.59 6.16 9.18
Counter‐Factuals
No TFP growth in agriculture ‐0.04 ‐0.10 0.05 0.00 5.76 4.60 4.50 8.46
No Reduction in Barriers ‐0.29 ‐0.12 ‐0.10 ‐0.07 5.04 3.88 4.05 7.44
       No Reduction in ag‐nonstate wage gap ‐0.34 ‐0.15 ‐0.13 ‐0.06 6.86 5.20 6.35 9.29
       No Reduction in state employment share ‐0.40 ‐0.27 ‐0.09 ‐0.04 5.64 5.50 4.66 6.87
       No Reduction in state wage premium ‐0.43 ‐0.28 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 6.90 6.27 4.90 9.80
No TFP growth in non‐state sector ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 3.46 3.85 2.87 3.67
No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 6.08 6.58 5.61 6.05
No reallocation of labor btw ag and non‐ag 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.28 4.79 5.89 8.38
No capital market distortion ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 8.83 9.02 7.18 10.44
No increase in investment rate since 1978 ‐0.37 ‐0.26 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 5.88 5.45 5.00 7.35
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.37 ‐0.26 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 7.31 7.71 5.92 8.43
No increase in investment rate since 1988 ‐0.40 ‐0.29 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 6.80 6.59 5.91 8.01
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.40 ‐0.29 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 8.27 6.59 8.95 9.38
No increase in investment rate since 1998 ‐0.41 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.04 7.00 6.59 6.16 8.40
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.41 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.04 8.34 6.59 6.16 12.72
Official Data 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007 1978‐2004 1978‐1991 1991‐2004 1998‐2007
Calibrated Model ‐0.30 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 7.14 6.96 6.55 8.01
Counter‐Factuals
No TFP growth in agriculture 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.03 4.71 4.09 4.05 6.16
No Reduction in Barriers ‐0.28 ‐0.14 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 5.52 5.92 4.02 6.74
       No Reduction in ag‐nonstate wage gap ‐0.33 ‐0.16 ‐0.10 ‐0.07 7.26 6.37 6.91 8.65
       No Reduction in state employment share ‐0.26 ‐0.19 ‐0.05 ‐0.01 5.67 6.74 4.58 5.68
       No Reduction in state wage premium ‐0.30 ‐0.20 ‐0.04 ‐0.06 6.81 6.74 5.28 8.58
No TFP growth in non‐state sector ‐0.30 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 2.74 4.27 1.24 2.70
No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.30 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 5.83 5.89 5.78 5.83
No reallocation of labor btw ag and non‐ag 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.93 5.09 5.75 7.06
No capital market distortion ‐0.30 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 8.43 7.48 8.33 9.59
No increase in investment rate since 1978 ‐0.23 ‐0.18 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 5.57 5.67 5.10 5.99
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.23 ‐0.18 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 6.75 6.15 6.77 7.38
No increase in investment rate since 1988 ‐0.26 ‐0.21 ‐0.04 ‐0.02 6.61 6.96 6.24 6.63
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.26 ‐0.21 ‐0.04 ‐0.02 7.84 6.96 8.46 8.12
No increase in investment rate since 1998 ‐0.27 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.02 6.85 6.96 6.55 7.05
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.27 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 ‐0.02 8.00 6.96 6.55 10.76Table 7. Counterfactual simulations using the model with infrastructure
                                                                    Change in Agirculture's Employment Share                                                                   Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Rate
Benchmark Data 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Calibrated Model ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 6.88 6.60 5.73 8.46
Counter‐Factuals
No TFP growth in agriculture ‐0.04 ‐0.10 0.05 0.00 5.34 4.59 3.98 7.68
No Reduction in Barriers ‐0.29 ‐0.12 ‐0.10 ‐0.07 5.28 4.30 4.06 7.71
       No Reduction in ag‐nonstate wage gap ‐0.34 ‐0.15 ‐0.13 ‐0.06 6.52 5.24 5.94 8.58
       No Reduction in state employment share ‐0.40 ‐0.27 ‐0.09 ‐0.04 5.87 5.93 4.67 7.15
       No Reduction in state wage premium ‐0.43 ‐0.28 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 6.53 6.28 4.49 9.08
No TFP growth in non‐state sector ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 3.24 3.97 2.40 3.36
No TFP growth in state sector ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 5.55 6.61 5.12 4.85
No reallocation of labor btw ag and non‐ag 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.02 4.93 5.56 7.75
No capital market distortion ‐0.43 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.06 7.87 8.02 6.33 9.40
No increase in investment rate since 1978 ‐0.37 ‐0.26 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 5.57 5.42 4.64 6.79
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.37 ‐0.26 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 6.45 6.74 5.17 7.56
No increase in investment rate since 1988 ‐0.40 ‐0.29 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 6.46 6.60 5.49 7.37
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.40 ‐0.29 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 7.36 6.60 7.26 8.33
No increase in investment rate since 1998 ‐0.41 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.04 6.65 6.60 5.73 7.74
      and no capital market distortion ‐0.41 ‐0.29 ‐0.08 ‐0.04 7.48 6.60 5.73 10.42Appendix
Simple Growth Accounting Using O¢ cial Data
Table A1 reports simple growth accounting results using o¢ cial de￿ ators and employment series.
The use of o¢ cial data only modestly modi￿es the basic picture. Rates of growth in output per
worker at the aggregate level are very similar between the benchmark and the o¢ cial data, with
the e⁄ect of slightly lower rates of in￿ ation in the o¢ cial data o⁄set by more rapid employment
growth. Using the o¢ cial de￿ ator for capital accumulation however makes capital deepening more
important and the contribution of TFP growth lower as a result of the more rapid growth in the
capital stock. A fairly similar picture using the benchmark and o¢ cial data also emerges with
respect to the non-agricultural sector. Gains in TFP growth in the state sector between the last
two periods are also much smaller using the o¢ cial data, largely because of the more rapid rates
of capital accumulation.14
Table A1 here
Comparison with the Literature
In Table A2, we compare our results from the standard aggregate growth accounting with a
number of prominent ones in the literatures constructed for similar periods. The di⁄erences are
marginal.
Table A2 here
For the slightly shorter period between 1978 and 1998, however, our estimate of TFP in the non-
primary sector is higher than that reported by Young (2003), which is often cited as an important
14Productivity in the state and non-state sectors based on an alternative relative wage series that includes in-kind
compensation leaves the growth accounting for the entire non-primary sectors unchanged. It also does not in￿ uence
the growth in capital per worker in either the state or non-state sector. The change does in￿ uence however the rate
of growth in labor productivity and our estimate of TFP in the two sectors, especially in the period up through 1998.
For the full period, the revision implies signi￿cantly higher growth in output per worker and TFP in the non-state
sectors, and very small increases in the state sector. The reason for the latter is that larger di⁄erences in output per
worker between the state and the non-state at the beginning implies that the reallocation of labor away from the
state will lower the growth rate of the non-agriculture sector, which must be compensated by higher growth rates
within the two sectors.
35benchmark in the assessment of Chinese data. Table A3 compares our estimates with those Young
provides to identify the underlying reasons for the di⁄erences. We focus on four key components:
nominal GDP estimates, de￿ ators, employment, and the capital stock.
Table A3 here
First, our estimates of nominal GDP growth are slightly higher than Young￿ s (15.74 versus
15.37) re￿ ecting the e⁄ect of the 2006 NBS revision to GDP estimates. Most of the revision
occurred in the tertiary sector. These revised estimates were not available to Young. Second,
as discussed in the text, we construct an alternative de￿ ator for the tertiary sector to re￿ ect the
growing role of businesses services, and the di⁄erences in the rate of in￿ ation in business services
compared to consumer services. Our alternative de￿ ator for the tertiary sector shows 2.5 percent
less in￿ ation per year. These two revisions lead to an upward revision in the rate of real GDP
growth in the non-primary sector from 8.1 to 9.5 percent annum, of which 0.4 percentage points is
due to the upward revision of nominal GDP estimates, and 1.0 percentage points is due to the use
of alternative de￿ ator for the tertiary sector. All else equal, they also result in an upward revision
of TFP of 1.4 percentage points.
The upward revision in the rate of growth in real output in the non-primary sector is partially
o⁄set by our revisions to the employment data, and di⁄erences in the employment series used.
Young extends an older employment series to cover the period between 1990 and 1998 rather
than combine the pre-1990 un-revised labor series with the revised series for the post-1998 period.
We combined the revised series after 1990, with our own revision to the pre-1990 data. We also
construct our own estimate of the share of the labor force in the primary sector, which results
in a more rapid exodus of labor out of agriculture, and more rapid growth of employment in the
non-primary sector. Young￿ s employment estimate shows growth of 4.5 percent annum between
1978 and 1998, compared to 5.6 per annum growth in our estimates. This reduces the gap in the
two estimates of output per worker: 3.6 by Young, versus our estimate of 3.93.
Finally, there are small di⁄erences in the estimates of the rate of capital accumulation that
re￿ ect di⁄erences in construction, and ￿xed investment de￿ ators. First, Young uses estimates of
36the breakdown in capital formation between the primary and non-primary sectors at the provincial
level to construct national-level estimates of the nominal capital stock in the non-primary sector.
A careful examination of these data makes them suspect in numerous provinces, and we selected
to construct estimates on the basis of national-level ￿xed investment data disaggregated by sector
and ownership. Second, there may be di⁄erences in the starting values used for the capital stock
in 1978, which could also a⁄ect the rate of growth. In nominal terms, Young￿ s capital stock grows
at 16.6 percent per annum compared to our estimate of 17.0. Third, there are small di⁄erences in
the de￿ ators. We have tried to use identical methods, but modest di⁄erences emerge on the order
of 0.6 percent per year. One potential source of the di⁄erence is the data on building costs for
structures: Young uses building costs for the state sector, while we use costs for both the state and
non-state. Young￿ s estimate of the capital stock grows at 7.7 percent per annum, compared to our
estimate of 6.6 percent.
To summarize, our estimate of GDP per worker grows at an annual rate of 3.93 percent compared
to Young￿ s 3.6 percent. Ignoring the role of human capital, and assuming a share of capital of 0.50,
our estimates imply a rate of growth of TFP in the non-primary sector of 3.4 percent per annum
compared to Young￿ s estimate of 2.0 percent. Adjustments for human capital will lower this by
between 0.5 and 1.0 percent per year.
Comparison of the model-based accounting with a simple decomposition.
Other authors have used a simple decomposition to quantify the contribution of the labor real-
location. The decomposition begins by noting that aggregate labor productivity can be expressed
as the weighted average of productivities in the two sectors: yt = yatlat+ynt(1￿lat). The aggregate











That is, the aggregate labor productivity growth can be decomposed into three sources: labor
productivity growth in both sectors and labor reallocation. Without labor movement between
the two sectors (i.e. dlat = 0), the growth rate of aggregate labor productivity simply equals the
37weighted average of the growth rates of labor productivities in the two sectors, with the weights
being the GDP shares of the two sectors, respectively. Any extra growth beyond this average, then,
is attributed to the labor reallocation.
These simple decompositions tell us that reallocation across sectors is positively associated
with growth, but the estimated magnitude of the reallocation e⁄ect resulting from this analysis is
likely to be biased. There are two primary reasons for believing that this is the case.15 First, the
reallocation of labor may be a result of the growth in TFP in the two sectors. If that is the case,
the decomposition may overestimate the role of the reallocation and underestimate the role of labor
productivity growth within sectors.16 And second, labor productivity growth within each of the
two sectors will depend on labor reallocation. Because of diminishing returns, all else equal, the
gap in productivities between the two sectors will narrow as labor is reallocated from agriculture
to non-agriculture. Simple decompositions ignore all these potentially important considerations
surrounding inter-sectoral productivity and labor ￿ ows.17 They provide no more than an upper
bound for the actual contribution of labor reallocation out of agriculture to overall growth during
China￿ s reform period.
Table A4 here
Table A4 reports the estimated contribution of the labor reallocation to labor productivity
growth using this popular approach as well as the estimated contribution obtained from the counter-
factual simulations based on our dynamic three-sector model. Our estimate is signi￿cantly less than
15There is also a third potential bias. The decompositions implicitly assume that the ￿gaps￿ in average and
marginal productivities of labor between sectors are the same. The returns to reallocation depend on di⁄erences in
marginal productivity however the decompositions are based on information on averages. If the underlying production
technology is Cobb-Douglas and labor shares in the two sectors are the same, the ratio of average and marginal
productivity between sectors will be the same, but this does not hold true for other functional forms. It is an
empirical matter as to how sensitive the returns to reallocation are to alternative assumptions about the underlying
technology. Based on sensitivity analysis we carried out, this is not an important consideration here.
16This bias generally exists in standard growth accounting in which the contribution of capital accumulation is
overestimated, and that of TFP is underestimated.
17The problems of using these simple decomposition methods are also revealed in trying to estimate the returns
to reallocation of labor between the state and non-state non-agricultural sector. At the beginning of reform, average
labor productivity in the state sector was actually higher than that in the non-state. This would imply negative
returns to the reallocation. However, di⁄erences in TFP between the two sectors o⁄set this.
38the estimate from the ￿naive￿simple decomposition. For the period between 1978 to 2007, the
contribution of the reallocation is only 13 percent compared to the 23 percent estimate using the
simple decomposition method. The di⁄erence is even larger for the ￿rst sub-period, when nearly
half of the reallocation occurred. Our model-based accounting suggests that the contribution of
labor reallocation to overall labor productivity growth is only 1.80 percentage points, while the
simple decomposition implies a contribution that is almost two times as large, 3.36 percentage
points. These di⁄erences point to the shortcomings of the simple decomposition method.
The Model with infrastructure capital investment by the state sector
We break down capital in the state sector into infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital and
denote them by Kpt and Kst, respectively. We modify the production functions for both the state













Following Aschauer (1989) and Hulten (1996), we assume that the production functions are constant
returns to scale with respect to all inputs. That is, ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿ = 1. Given these assumptions and
the parameter choices, we can then calculate the returns to infrastructure capital and to capital in
















To empirically calculate these returns, we need to estimate the infrastructure capital in the
data. To do so we break the investment by the state into infrastructure and non-infrastructure in-
vestments. We then use the investment data to generate the infrastructure and non-infrastructure
capital stock, respectively. China￿ s ￿xed investment yearbooks provide annual data on the compo-
39sition of state-sector ￿xed investment. We use a broad de￿nition of infrastructure, and include state
investment in transportation; electricity, gas and water; water management; health, and education.
Of these categories, transportation and power are the most important, and represent more than
eighty percent of total state infrastructure investment. Over time, the share of state investment
going to infrastructures steadily rises from 25 percent at the start of the reforms to as high as
49.6 percent in 2006. Since our de￿nition of state sector investment also includes shareholding
companies (which are not included in the de￿nition above of state ￿xed investment), we then apply
our estimates of the share of state investment going to infrastructure to total investment by the
state (state owned plus shareholding companies) to obtain our estimate of total state infrastruc-
ture investment. Finally, the non-infrastructure capital stock in the state sector is simply the total
capital stock in the state sector minus the infrastructure capital stock.
We continue to set ￿ to 0.5. For the output elasticities of infrastructure and non-infrastructure
capital, we calibrate their values by assuming that the returns to infrastructure capital and the








We can calculate the average output to capital ratios Yn
Kp and Yns
Kns from the data. The equation
above and the fact that ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿ = 1 then allow us to pin down the value of ￿1 and ￿2, which
turn out to be 0.15 and 0.35, respectively.
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Aggregate   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 7.46 6.73 7.09 8.68
   capital per worker 4.28 3.54 3.97 5.46
   TFP 3.17 3.19 3.12 3.22
Non‐agricultural 1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 5.97 4.75 5.89 7.40
   capital per worker 3.08 1.93 2.92 4.55
   TFP 2.88 2.82 2.97 2.86
Non‐State   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 6.88 5.94 7.64 7.09
   capital per worker 2.14 ‐0.15 2.53 4.25
   TFP 4.74 6.09 5.11 2.84
State   1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Output per worker 6.58 5.35 4.95 9.74
   capital per worker 5.21 3.64 5.03 7.17




Y/L K   Education TFP TFP TFP and 
Education
Period
Bosworth and Collins (2008) 1978‐2004 9.3 2.0 7.3 3.2 0.3 3.6 49.3 53.4
 
1978‐1993 8.9 2.5 6.4 2.4 0.4 3.5 54.7 60.9
 








Zheng, Bigsten and Hu (2006) 1978‐1993 9.9 2.5 7.4 3.1 4.3 58.6
 




Brandt and Zhu (2009) 1978‐2007 9.3 1.7 7.6 3.6 3.9 51.3
 
1978‐1993 8.3 2.4 6.0 2.5 3.5 58.3
 




Table A2: Comparison of Growth Accounting Exercises in the LiteratureTable A3. Comparison with Alwyn Young (2003)
 
Young (2003) BZ(2009) Explanation for difference
Nominal GDP 15.4 15.7 Revision by NBS in 2006
  Nonagr GDP 16.0 16.4 Revision by NBS in 2006
GDP deflators
   Primary 7.9 7.9 Identical
   Secondary 6.1 6.1 Identical
   Tertiary 10.7 8.2 We constructed new deflator that captures 
costs of business services. Young uses 
consumer service deflator
Capital stock deflator 8.9 9.5
Use nearly identical method, however we 
use unit building costs for all structures, 
while Young uses for state sector only
Real GDP 7.4 8.7 27 percent of difference due to revised nominal 
GDP numbers; 73 percent due to revised tertiary 
sector deflator 
   Real nonagr 8.1 9.5
Labor 2.2 2.1 Differences in employment series used
   Agr 0.8 -0.2 Differences in emploment series used and 
our use of alternative estimate for share of 
labor in primary sector
   Nonagr 4.5 5.6 Same as above
Real GDP per worker 5.2 6.6
    Agr
    Nonagr 3.6 3.9
Labor shares nonagr
1978 0.3  
1998 0.5 0.5
Capital stock
  Nominal 16.6 17.0 Due to differences in construction. Young 
bases estimates of composition on 
provincial GFCF data while we construct 
estimates using sector estimates for state, 
collective and housing sector for fixed 
investment; may also be differences in 
starting values 
  Real 7.7 6.6 55 percent due to differences in deflator, and 
45 percent due to differences in estimate of 
nominal capital stock
TFP excluding human capital 2.0 3.4Table A4.  Contribution to Growth of the Reallocation of Labor from Agriculture
1978‐2007 1978‐1988 1988‐1998 1998‐2007
Based on simple decomposition: 
growth rate 1.74 3.36 0.80 1.20
percentage 0.23 0.50   0.12 0.12
Based on the model: 
growth rate 0.97 1.80 0.27 0.80
percentage 0.13 0.27   0.04 0.08